Following the phenomenology that is revealed by the emergent structure of consciousness, the path will lead to the acknowledgement of consciousness having a self-referential aspect. By following phenomenological clues, properties of self-reference will be revealed. The two most prominent properties of self-reference will be shown to be inclusion and transcendence that will be shown to be found everywhere in the phenomenology of consciousness. Also, self-reference will turn out to be unformalizable, this imposing limits on what a theory of consciousness can ever achieve. The unformalizability of self-reference would be shown to be because self-reference: is itself, includes itself, and transcendes itself, all at the same time. Nevertheless, unformalizability will be shown to be an essential feature needed to bring essences into existence.
Keywords consciousness  self-reference  emergent structure  phenomenology  unformalizable
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The Liar Paradox.JC Beall & Michael Glanzberg - 2010 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. CSLI Publications.

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