Journal of Philosophical Research 35:107-21 (2010)
In this paper, I clarify Descartes’s account of belief, in general, and of judgment, in particular. Then, drawing upon this clarification, I explain the type of direct doxastic voluntarism that he endorses. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate two claims. First, I argue that there is strong textual evidence that, on Descartes’s account, people have the ability to suspend, or to withhold, judgment directly by an act will. Second, I argue that there is weak and inconclusive textual evidence that, on his account, people have the ability to form a judgment directly by an act will. I conclude by suggestion that understanding the position Descartes actually endorses (which I call ‘negative direct doxastic voluntarism’) has implications, more broadly, for contemporary participants in the doxastic voluntarism debate.
|Keywords||Descartes belief will|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-Contravening Commitments.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):73-82.
Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):171-176.
A New Rejection of Doxastic Voluntarism.Sergi Rosell - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):97-112.
The Will and Evidence Toward Belief: A Critical Essay on Jonathan E. Adler's Belief's Own Ethics.Nathan Segars - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):79 – 91.
Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.
Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.
Doxastic Decisions and Controlling Belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
Added to index2011-10-19
Total downloads69 ( #77,121 of 2,178,176 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #112,524 of 2,178,176 )
How can I increase my downloads?