Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368 (2016)

Authors
Eric Vogelstein
Duquesne University
Abstract
This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2016.1169383
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References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reasons for Emotion and Moral Motivation.Reid Blackman - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):805-827.

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