Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology

Philosophical Review 104 (4):621 (1995)
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Abstract

For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalism and coherentism has narrowed lately, and Susan Haack attempts to synthesize these competing accounts into a view she calls "foundherentism."

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Author Profiles

Jonathan Vogel
Amherst College
Susan Haack
University of Miami

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