Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432 (2011)

Authors
Eric Vogelstein
Duquesne University
Abstract
Morality is commonly thought to be normative in a robust and important way. This is commonly cashed out in terms of normative reasons. It is also commonly thought that morality is necessarily and universally normative, i.e., that moral reasons are reasons for any possible moral agent. Taking these commonplaces for granted, I argue for a novel view of moral normativity. I challenge the standard view that moral reasons are reasons to act. I suggest that moral reasons are reasons for having sentiments—in particular, compassion and respect—and I argue that this view has important advantages over the standard view of moral normativity.
Keywords Morality  Normativity  Reasons  Humeanism  Sentiments  Compassion  Respect
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9579-z
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Normativity.Eric Vogelstein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095.
A New Moral Sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.
Reasons for Emotion and Moral Motivation.Reid Blackman - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):805-827.

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