Morality, reasons, and sentiments

Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Morality is commonly thought to be normative in a robust and important way. This is commonly cashed out in terms of normative reasons. It is also commonly thought that morality is necessarily and universally normative, i.e., that moral reasons are reasons for any possible moral agent. Taking these commonplaces for granted, I argue for a novel view of moral normativity. I challenge the standard view that moral reasons are reasons to act. I suggest that moral reasons are reasons for having sentiments—in particular, compassion and respect—and I argue that this view has important advantages over the standard view of moral normativity.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,560

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34.
Practical Reasons and Moral 'Ought'.Patricia Greenspan - 2007 - In Russell Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II. Clarendon Press. pp. 172-194.
Asymmetrical Practical Reasons.Patricia Greenspan - 2005 - In J. C. Marek & M. E. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Vienna: ÖBV and HPT. pp. 387-94.
Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons.Marion Hourdequin - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
Normativity and interpersonal reasons.Ken O'Day - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):61-87.
Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-19

Downloads
161 (#107,509)

6 months
6 (#199,414)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Eric Vogelstein
Duquesne University

Citations of this work

Reasons for emotion and moral motivation.Reid Blackman - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):805-827.
Moral normativity.Eric Vogelstein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095.
A new moral sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.

View all 46 references / Add more references