Reply to Wilson Mendonça’s “Supervenience arguments against robust moral realism”

Filosofia Unisinos 20 (3) (2019)
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10.4013/fsu.2019.203.07

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Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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