Subjective Reasons

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257 (2012)
Abstract
In recent years, the notion of a reason has come to occupy a central place in both metaethics and normative theory more broadly. Indeed, many philosophers have come to view reasons as providing the basis of normativity itself . The common conception is that reasons are facts that count in favor of some act or attitude. More recently, philosophers have begun to appreciate a distinction between objective and subjective reasons, where (roughly) objective reasons are determined by the facts, while subjective reasons are determined by one's beliefs. My goal in this paper is to offer a plausible theory of subjective reasons. Although much attention has been focused on theories of objective reasons, very little has been offered in the literature regarding what sort of account of subjective reasons we should adopt; and what has been offered is rather perfunctory, and requires filling-out. Taking what has been said thus far as a starting point, I will consider several putative theories of subjective reasons, offering objections and amendments along the way, will settle on what I take to be a highly plausible account, and will defend that account against objections
Keywords Reasons  Subjective reasons  Normativity
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-011-9286-7
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References found in this work BETA
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Having Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.

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Citations of this work BETA
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
Decision Making in the Face of Parity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.
Moral Normativity.Eric Vogelstein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1083-1095.
A New Moral Sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.

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