Subjective Reasons

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257 (2012)

Abstract

In recent years, the notion of a reason has come to occupy a central place in both metaethics and normative theory more broadly. Indeed, many philosophers have come to view reasons as providing the basis of normativity itself . The common conception is that reasons are facts that count in favor of some act or attitude. More recently, philosophers have begun to appreciate a distinction between objective and subjective reasons, where (roughly) objective reasons are determined by the facts, while subjective reasons are determined by one's beliefs. My goal in this paper is to offer a plausible theory of subjective reasons. Although much attention has been focused on theories of objective reasons, very little has been offered in the literature regarding what sort of account of subjective reasons we should adopt; and what has been offered is rather perfunctory, and requires filling-out. Taking what has been said thus far as a starting point, I will consider several putative theories of subjective reasons, offering objections and amendments along the way, will settle on what I take to be a highly plausible account, and will defend that account against objections

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,694

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-18

Downloads
170 (#71,096)

6 months
1 (#388,311)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Eric Vogelstein
Duquesne University

References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.
Which Reasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-9.
Friendship and Reasons of Intimacy.Diane Jeske - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):329-346.
Subjective Theories of Well-Being.Chris Heathwood - 2014 - In Ben Eggleston & Dale Miller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-219.
Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oxford University Press.
Basic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Can Animals Act For Reasons?Hans-Johann Glock - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):232-254.
Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Morality, Reasons, and Sentiments.Eric Vogelstein - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.
Reasons and Impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.