Authors
Giorgio Volpe
Università degli Studi di Bologna
Abstract
_ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 258 - 271 This contribution to the symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s _Extended Rationality_ is largely sympathetic with the moderate view of the structure of epistemic warrant which is defended in the book. However, it takes issue with some aspects of Coliva’s Wittgenstein-inspired ‘hinge epistemology’, focussing especially on her conception of propositional warrant, her treatment of epistemic closure, her antirealist conception of truth, and the significance of her answer to so-called Humean scepticism.
Keywords epistemic closure   extended rationality   propositional warrant   scepticism   truth  moderatism
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DOI 10.1163/22105700-00704004
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Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Truth as One and Many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Clarendon Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.
Truth as One and Many. [REVIEW]Michael Lynch - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):191-193.

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