How to get a non-intensionalist, propositional, moderately realist truthconditional account of internal metafictional sentences
Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):179-199 (2006)
In what follows, I will first try to show that both anti-realist and realist intensionalist truthconditional accounts of internal metafictional sentences (i.e., sentences of the form "in the story S, p") are unsatisfactory. Moreover, I will claim that this does not mean that propositional truthconditional accounts of those sentences are to be dispensed with; simply, one has to provide a non-intensionalist propositional truthconditional account of those sentences. Finally, I will show that this account is fully compatible with a realist interpretation of those sentences' truthconditions according to which at least some of those sentences commit one to fictional entities.
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