Refined Invariantism
Theoria 86 (1):100-127 (2020)
Abstract
A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1111/theo.12221
My notes
Similar books and articles
Epistemic invariantism and contextualist intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):219-232.
Skeptical pragmatic invariantism: good, but not good enough.Alexander Dinges - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2577-2593.
Intrusión pragmática y valor epistémico.Pascal Engel - 2011 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 23 (1):25-51.
Knowledge across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Peter Baumann - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (2):363-380.
Strict moderate invariantism and knowledge-denials.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2029-2044.
The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions: A Defence of Moderate Invariantism.Leonid Tarasov - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Manchester
The problem with subject-sensitive invariantism.Keith Derose - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
Time constraints and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Joseph Shin - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):157-180.
Epistemic contextualism: a normative approach.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Epistemic contextualism: a normative approach.Robert James McKenna - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Analytics
Added to PP
2019-12-16
Downloads
147 (#87,131)
6 months
18 (#59,204)
2019-12-16
Downloads
147 (#87,131)
6 months
18 (#59,204)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
You always have a reason to check! A new take on the bank cases.Jacques-Henri Vollet - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-12.
References found in this work
Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith Derose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:57-89.
Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.