Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1):89-111 (2018)
AbstractIn this essay, I defend a Wollheimian account of a twofold picture perception. While I agree with Wollheim’s objectors that a picture involves three layers that qualify a picture in its complexity -- its vehicle, what is seen in it, and its subject --, I argue that the third layer does not involve perception, even indirectly: what is seen in a picture constrains its subject to be a subject of a certain kind, yet it does not force the latter to be pictorially perceived, not even indirectly. So, even if a picture is three-layered, pictorial experience remains a twofold experience, as Wollheim claimed. Neither the proponents of threefoldness nor Wollheim himself, however, have convincingly explained how the experience really is a perceptual experience. My Wollheimian account thus aims to reconceive the pictorial experience in properly perceptual terms.
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References found in this work
Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science.Ned Block - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.John McDowell - 1983 - In Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 68: 1982. Oxford University Press. pp. 455-79.
Citations of this work
Different Kinds of Fusion Experiences.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):203-222.
What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
The Paradox of Pictorial Representation. A Wittgensteinian Solution.Alessandro Cavazzana - 2021 - Studi di Estetica 21 (3):137-155.
Substitution by Image: The Very Idea.Jakub Stejskal - 2019 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77 (1):55-66.
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