The nameability of possible objects
From a Logical Point of View 3:14-33 (1994)
AbstractWithin the general framework of the theory of direct reference, there is no agreement as to whether unactualised possible objects (from now on, possibilia) can be referred to by means of directly referential singular terms (from now on, DR terms). While some have maintained that such a direct reference can be established e.g. via some fixing-reference description (Kaplan, Salmon, and perhaps Kripke himself), others have denied any such possibility. In what follows, I will scrutinise such denials by attempting at the same time to provide some counterarguments to them. Indeed, I believe that possibilia can be referred to directly, primarily if the appropriate fixing-reference description is provided.
Similar books and articles
The Problem of Reference to Nonexistents in Cocchiarella’s Conceptual Realism.Andriy Vasylchenko - 2009 - Axiomathes 19 (2):155-166.
Fixing the reference of theoretical terms.Robert Nola - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):505-531.
Can negative existentials be referentially vindicated?Alberto Voltolini - 1994 - Lingua E Stile 29:397-419.
The fallacies of the new theory of reference.Jaakko Hintikka & Gabriel Sandu - 1995 - Synthese 104 (2):245 - 283.
Direct Reference and Singular Propositions.Matthew Davidson - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):285-300.
Direct reference in thought and speech.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1993 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 26 (1):49-76.
Can there be a uniform application of direct reference?Alberto Voltolini - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):75-98.
Introducing events, successful reference and reference-fixing.Friedel Weinert - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (1):155-167.
A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports.Stephen Schiffer - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):361-368.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.