Why, as responsible for figurativity, seeing-in can only be inflected seeing-in

Alberto Voltolini
Università degli Studi di Torino
In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation of the properties by which a certain subject is seen in a given picture as having refers to the design properties of the picture’s vehicle, i.e., to the visible surface properties of that vehicle that are responsible for the fact that one such subject is seen in it, precisely taken in such a design role. Finally, I will try to show that seeing-in is qualified by inflection independently of whether it is conscious or unconscious seeing-in
Keywords Seeing-in  Figurativity  Inflection   Trompe-l’oeils  Naturalistic pictures  Unconscious pictures
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11097-013-9335-x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,024
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Why Visual Attention and Awareness Are Different.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
Understanding Pictures.Dominic Lopes - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Review Of: Painting as an Art by Richard Wollheim. [REVIEW]Joseph Margolis - 1989 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47 (3):281-284.
Seeing-in and Seeming to See.R. Hopkins - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):650-659.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Visual Feeling of Presence.Gabriele Ferretti - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):112-136.
Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?Gabriele Ferretti - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (3):372-393.
Image Consciousness and the Horizonal Structure of Perception.Walter Hopp - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):130-153.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Inflected and Uninflected Perception of Pictures.Bence Nanay - 2010 - In C. Abell & K. Bantilaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford University Press.
Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance.Robert Hopkins - 2010 - In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Picturing. Oxford University Press. pp. 151.
Why the Pictorial Relation is Not Reference.Alon Chasid - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):226-247.
Structure, Intention and Representation.Göran Hermeren - 1977 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 3:89-106.
Hallucinatory Pictures.Roberto Casati - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):365-368.
Reasons for Looking: Lopes on the Value of Pictures.Robert Hopkins - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):556-569.
Internal and External Pictures.Catharine Abell & Gregory Currie - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):429-445.
Touching Pictures.Robert Hopkins - 2000 - British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (1):149-167.
Perceiving Pictures.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):461-480.
Pictures, Pictorial Contents and Vision.Dominic Gregory - 2010 - British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):15-32.
Understanding Pictures.Dominic Lopes - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Is Twofoldness Necessary for Representational Seeing?Bence Nanay - 2005 - British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (3):248-257.


Added to PP index

Total views
45 ( #160,346 of 2,319,694 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #446,517 of 2,319,694 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature