Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:61-74 (1980)
"Agreement" is the key notion in Wittgenstein's explanation of the possibility of public language. Agreement in judgements constitutes the justification for asserting agreement in definitions. The determinates of rules are empirical; rules as determinables are transcendental. Rules are on the limit of public language, and not within it. Wittgenstein's skeptical solutions to skepticism about language and about the given are transcendentalistic. His skeptical solutions in other areas are conventionalistic. Skepticism about mental phenomena is not solved because of a systematic rule-gap for the application of non-dispositional psychological concepts
|Keywords||Language Private Language Scepticism Kripke, S Wittgenstein|
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