Must . . . stay . . . strong!

Natural Language Semantics 18 (4):351-383 (2010)

Authors
Kai von Fintel
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Anthony Gillies
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
It is a recurring mantra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must
Keywords Modality  Epistemic  Evidentiality
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DOI 10.1007/s11050-010-9058-2
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (160):393-395.
CIA Leaks.Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (1):77-98.
The Logic of Conventional Implicatures.Chris Potts - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):707-749.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dynamics of Epistemic Modality.Malte Willer - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):45-92.
Believing Epistemic Contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
A Judge-Free Semantics for Predicates of Personal Taste.H. Pearson - 2013 - Journal of Semantics 30 (1):103-154.
Grading Modal Judgment.Nate Charlow - forthcoming - Mind:fzz028.

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