Must . . . stay . . . strong!

Natural Language Semantics 18 (4):351-383 (2010)
Abstract
It is a recurring mantra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must
Keywords Modality  Epistemic  Evidentiality
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DOI 10.1007/s11050-010-9058-2
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References found in this work BETA
Reasoning About Knowledge.Ronald Fagin (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
Epistemic Possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
Semantics.John Lyons - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.

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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Modals and Common Ground.Ezra Cook - 2013 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):179-209.
Modality in Language.Eric Swanson - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1193-1207.
The Revenge of the Semantics‐Pragmatics Distinction.Josh Dever - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):104-144.

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