Norms of higher order

Studia Logica 42 (2-3):119 - 127 (1983)

Abstract

The paper is based upon a conception of norms as prescriptions which are neither true nor false. Two norms may be said to contradict one another when the conjunction of (the descriptions of) their contents is a logical contradiction. A norm is said to entail another norm when the first norm and the negation-norm of the second contradict one another. By the negation-norm of an obligation is understood a permission "to the contrary", and by the negation-norm of a permission an obligation "to the contrary". On the basis of these definitions it can be shown that the axioms and theorems of first order standard deontic logic are "normative tautologies". Norms of higher order may be viewed as prescriptions "transmitting the will" of a higher or sovereign authority through a lower or sub-ordinate authority to the norm-subjects. Under this conception of the orders, it is provable that a "complete" system of deontic logic is S4-like

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Citations of this work

Does Ought Imply Ought Ought?Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):702-716.
‘Ought Implies Can’ and the Law.Chris Fox & Guglielmo Feis - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):370-393.

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