Thoughts, motor actions, and the self

Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43 (2007)
The comparator-model, originally developed to explain motor action, has recently been invoked to explain several aspects of the self. However, in the first place it may not be used to explain a basic self-world distinction because it presupposes one. Our alternative account is based on specific systematic covariation between action and perception. Secondly, the comparator model cannot explain the feeling of ownership of thoughts. We argue—contra Frith and Campbell—that thoughts are not motor processes and therefore cannot be described by the comparator-model. Rather, thoughts can be the triggering cause (intention) for actions. An alternative framework for the explanation of thought insertion in schizophrenics is presented.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00298.x
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References found in this work BETA
Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.

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Citations of this work BETA
Explaining Delusions of Control: The Comparator Model 20years On.Chris Frith - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):52-54.

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