Data meet theory: up close and inferentially personal

Synthese 182 (1):89 - 100 (2011)
In a recent paper James Bogen and James Woodward denounce a set of views on confirmation that they collectively brand 'IRS'. The supporters of these views cast confirmation in terms of Inferential Relations between observational and theoretical Sentences. Against 1RS accounts of confirmation, Bogen and Woodward unveil two main objections: (a) inferential relations are not necessary to model confirmation relations since many data are neither in sentential form nor can they be put in such a form and (b) inferential relations are not sufficient to model confirmation relations because the former cannot capture evidentially relevant factors about the detection processes and instruments that generate the data. In this paper I have a two-fold aim: (i) to show that Bogen and Woodward fail to provide compelling grounds for the rejection of IRS models and (ii) to highlight some of the models' neglected merits
Keywords Data  Phenomena  Confirmation  Inferences  Bogen  Woodward
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9614-9
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References found in this work BETA
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
Saving the Phenomena.James Bogen & James Woodward - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.
Data and Phenomena.Jim Woodward - 1989 - Synthese 79 (3):393 - 472.

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Citations of this work BETA
Objectivity in Confirmation: Post Hoc Monsters and Novel Predictions.Ioannis Votsis - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):70-78.
Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments Without Logical Omniscience.Gregor Betz - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137.

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