The epistemic form of structural realism asserts that our knowledge of the world is restricted to its structural features. Several proponents of this view assume that the world possesses non-structural features; features which, according to their view, cannot be known. In other words, they assume that there is, or, there ought to be (on the basis of normative arguments in epistemology), always a gap between our epistemological and ontological commitments. The ontic form of structural realism denies that this is, or ought to be, the case. Proponents of this view argue that the perfect alignment of epistemological and ontological commitments is a highly desirable metatheoretical feature. They argue this on the basis of the prima facie sensible principle that our ontological commitments ought never to overreach our epistemic ones. Naturally the issue of alignment transcends the debate between the epistemic and the ontic structural realists. Is it in principle impossible for there to be circumstances under which we ought to subscribe to the misalignment of epistemological and ontological commitments? What do the different answers to this question entail for ontic structural realism?
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Whence Ontological Structural Realism?Juha Saatsi - 2009 - In M. Suarez (ed.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer.
Do Objects Depend on Structures?J. Wolff - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):607-625.
On the Preferability of Epistemic Structural Realism.Matteo Morganti - 2004 - Synthese 142 (1):81--107.
Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?Matteo Morganti - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1165-1176.
Ontic Structural Realism and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Michael Esfeld - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):19-32.
How Not to Be a Realist.Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - In Elaine M. Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structure, Objects and Causality, , Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol. 77. Springer. pp. 59-76.
Ontological Priority: The Conceptual Basis of Non-Eliminative, Ontic Structural Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - unknown -
The Epistemological Status of Scientific Theories: An Investigation of the Structural Realist Account.Ioannis Votsis - 2004 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
Moderate Structural Realism About Space-Time.Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam - 2006 - Synthese 160 (1):27 - 46.
A Critical Analysis of Structural Realism.Wei Wang - 2008 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (2):294-306.
The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism.Michael Esfeld - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):179 – 194.
The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity.Vincent Lam & Michael Esfeld - 2012 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (2):243-258.
Added to index2011-06-20
Total downloads51 ( #96,952 of 2,132,318 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #176,445 of 2,132,318 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.