Ecumenical empiricism

Abstract

Empiricism has been a pivotal philosophical topic for more than two millennia. Several Sophists, Aristotle, the Epicureans, Sextus Empiricus, Francis Bacon, Locke, Hume, Mill, Mach and the Logical Empiricists represent a long line of historically influential empiricists who share a prioritising of the sensory over all other forms of knowledge. The latest influential incarnation, Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, takes science to aim at empirically adequate theories, i.e. theories that save all and only the observable phenomena. Roughly put, an object or phenomenon is observable in van Fraassen’s view if a properly functioning member of the human epistemic community can detect it via their unaided senses. Scientific realists and other critics have contested this notion citing among other reasons that most knowledge in natural science concerns objects that can only be detected with instruments, i.e. those that are unobservable and hence unknowable by van Fraassen’s lights. Beg-the-question accusations fly back and forth. As a consequence a stalemate has ensued in the scientific realism debate

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Ioannis Votsis
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

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