The epistemological status of scientific theories: An investigation of the structural realist account

Dissertation, London School of Economics (2004)
In this dissertation, I examine a view called ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’, which holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a structure. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable scientific realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of its rivals.
Keywords structural realism  scientific realism  empiricism  underdetermination  empirical equivalence  Newman problem  pessimistic meta-induction
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,349
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605-636.
A Structure of the Consumption Function.Hsiang‐Ke Chao - 2007 - Journal of Economic Methodology 14 (2):227-248.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
132 ( #37,481 of 2,193,594 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #290,647 of 2,193,594 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature