Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368–382 (2004)
David Lewis (1980) proposed the Principal Principle (PP) and a “reformulation” which later on he called ‘OP’ (Old Principle). Reacting to his belief that these principles run into trouble, Lewis (1994) concluded that they should be replaced with the New Principle (NP). This conclusion left Lewis uneasy, because he thought that an inverse form of NP is “quite messy”, whereas an inverse form of OP, namely the simple and intuitive PP, is “the key to our concept of chance”. I argue that, even if OP should be discarded, PP need not be. Moreover, far from being messy, an inverse form of NP is a simple and intuitive Conditional Principle (CP). Finally, both PP and CP are special cases of a General Principle (GP); it follows that so are PP and NP, which are thus compatible rather than competing.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Citations of this work BETA
Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431.
Similar books and articles
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
On Higher-Order and Free-Floating Chances.Justin C. Fisher - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):691-707.
Who's Afraid of Undermining? Why the Principal Principle Might Not Contradict Humean Supervenience.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):151 - 174.
Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
On What We Know About Chance.Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.
Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle.Robert Black - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads150 ( #30,195 of 2,153,475 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #105,171 of 2,153,475 )
How can I increase my downloads?