Collective intentionality, evolutionary biology and social reality

Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265 (2003)
Abstract
The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle"s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that "collective intentionality" is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle"s dedication to a strong notion of collective intentionality considerably delimits the scope of his endeavor. Furthermore, evolutionary theory does not vindicate that an innate capacity for collective intentionality is a necessary precondition for cooperative behavior. 1
Keywords Biology  Collective  Evolution  Individual  Intentionality  Social Philosophy  Searle, J
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DOI 10.1080/10002003098538753
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Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Harvard University Press.

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