A Wrong Turn to Reasons?

In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan (2011)

Abstract

This paper argues that the recent metaethical turn to reasons as the fundamental units of normativity offers no special advantage in explaining a variety of other normative and evaluative phenomena, unless perhaps a form of reductionism about reasons is adopted which is rejected by many of those who advocate turning to reasons.

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Pekka Väyrynen
University of Leeds

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Citations of this work

Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
The Metaphysics of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 255-274.
How Do Reasons Accrue?Shyam Nair - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press. pp. 56–73.
Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought's.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.

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