In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 235-70 (2012)
This paper presents an alternative to the standard view that the evaluations that the so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics may be used to convey belong to their sense or semantic meaning. I describe a large variety of linguistic data that are well explained by the alternative view that the evaluations that (at least a very wide range of) thick terms and concepts may be used to convey are a certain kind of defeasible implications of their utterances which can be given a conversational explanation. I then provide some reasons to think that this explanation of the data is superior to the standard view, but a fuller assessment must await further work. In closing I briefly survey the largely deflationary consequences of this account regarding the significance of thick terms and concepts for evaluative thought and judgment.
|Keywords||moral semantics thick concepts pragmatics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Disentangling the Thick Concept Argument.Olle Blomberg - 2007 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):63-78.
Metaethics Meets Virtue Epistemology: Salvaging Disagreement About the Epistemically Thick.Heather Battaly - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):435-454.
Through Thick and Thin: Validity and Reflective Judgment.April Flakne - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (3):115-126.
Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
‘BOGHOSSIAN's BLIND REASONING’, CONDITIONALIZATION AND THICK CONCEPTS A FUNCTIONAL MODEL.Olga Ramirez - 2012 - Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.
Added to index2010-08-11
Total downloads111 ( #44,094 of 2,163,570 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #84,270 of 2,163,570 )
How can I increase my downloads?