Progress: Metaphysical and otherwise

Philosophy of Science 53 (3):354-371 (1986)
Abstract
Realism about progress--that progress consists in the obtaining of some metaphysical relation between a sequence of theories and the world--is often thought to be required by realism about the representational character of theories. The purpose of this paper is to show how one can be a realist about theories without being a realist about progress. The result is a view that cannot be at odds with what the history of science shows
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DOI 10.1086/289322
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