Authors
Thomas Pölzler
University of Graz
Abstract
Philosophical arguments often assume that the folk tends towards moral objectivism. Although recent psychological studies have indicated that lay persons’ attitudes to morality are best characterized in terms of non-objectivism-leaning pluralism, it has been maintained that the folk may be committed to moral objectivism implicitly. Since the studies conducted so far almost exclusively assessed subjects’ metaethical attitudes via explicit cognitions, the strength of this rebuttal remains unclear. The current study attempts to test the folk’s implicit metaethical commitments. We present results of a newly developed Implicit Association Test for metaethical attitudes which indicate that the folk generally tend towards moral non-objectivism on the implicit level as well. We discuss implications of this finding for the philosophical debate.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s13164-021-00572-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,564
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Weirdest People in the World?Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):61-83.
Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Moral Objectivism Across the Lifespan.James R. Beebe & David Sackris - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):912-929.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Cultural Variations in Folk Epistemic Intuitions.Finn Spicer - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):515-529.
Debunking (the) Retribution (Gap).Steven R. Kraaijeveld - 2019 - Science and Engineering Ethics:1-14.
Nietzsche’s Metaethical Stance.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2013 - In Ken Gemes & John Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Oxford University Press.
Unifying Moral Methodology.Tristram Mcpherson - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):523-549.
Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-11-12

Total views
5 ( #1,211,327 of 2,533,484 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #261,612 of 2,533,484 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes