The extra qualia problem: Synaesthesia and representationism

Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):263-281 (1999)
Abstract
Representationism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Synaesthesia is a condition in which the phenomenal character of the experience produced in a subject by stimulation of one sensory modality contains elements characteristic of a second, unstimulated sensory modality. After reviewing some of the recent psychological literature on synaesthesia and one of the leading versions of representationism, I argue that cases of synaesthesia, as instances of what I call the extra qualia problem, are counterexamples to externalist versions of representationism
Keywords Qualia  Representationism  Science  Synaesthesia
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/095150899105756
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,146
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Vision.David Marr - 1982 - Freeman.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Inverted Earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
The Primary Quality View of Color.Frank Jackson - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:199-219.
Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationalism.Michael Tye - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):459-78.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Rethinking Synesthesia.Michael Sollberger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187.
Intentionalism and Intransitivity.Max Deutsch - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
Synaesthesia and Misrepresentation: A Reply to Wager.Richard Gray - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):339-46.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

119 ( #39,466 of 2,151,990 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #119,468 of 2,151,990 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums