Wider den doxastischen Kompatibilismus

Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (4):569-595 (2019)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show that doxastic compatibilists are making a strong case for genuine doxastic freedom when modelled on compatibilist free will. Unfortunately, their arguments from analogy can be used for the introduction of rather odd forms of freedom that concern our emotions, e.g. “freedom of fear” and “freedom of anger”. The author argues that this problem of overgeneralisation also concerns free will compatibilists who originally provided the weak conditions that are used by doxastic compatibilists. She points out the possibilities and costs of avoiding these consequences and concludes that the standard compatibilist picture is not tenable.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,694

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-08-01

Downloads
54 (#213,930)

6 months
1 (#388,311)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Verena Wagner
Universität Konstanz

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Freedom and Determinism: The Importance of Method.Mark Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):38-57.
The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.
Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Patrick Todd - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):395-407.
Freedom Without Responsibility.Michael S. Pritchard - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (3):638-639.
The Elusiveness of Doxastic Compatibilism.Benjamin Bayer - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):233-252.
Freedom and (Theoretical) Reason.Margaret Schmitt - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):25-41.
The Contrariety of Compatibilist Positions.Saul Smilansky - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:293-309.
Freedom of the Will: A Possible Alternative.N. Elzein - 2008 - Dissertation, University College London