Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (4):569-595 (2019)
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to show that doxastic compatibilists are making a strong case for genuine doxastic freedom when modelled on compatibilist free will. Unfortunately, their arguments from analogy can be used for the introduction of rather odd forms of freedom that concern our emotions, e.g. “freedom of fear” and “freedom of anger”. The author argues that this problem of overgeneralisation also concerns free will compatibilists who originally provided the weak conditions that are used by doxastic compatibilists. She points out the possibilities and costs of avoiding these consequences and concludes that the standard compatibilist picture is not tenable.
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