An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization

Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588 (2013)
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Abstract

Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: if (X & Y), then (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals, or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals.

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Author Profiles

Robert Williams
University of Leeds
Lee Walters
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals.Lee Walters - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):322-346.
Against Hypothetical Syllogism.Lee Walters - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):979-997.
Conditionals, Modals, and Hypothetical Syllogism.Lee Walters - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):90-97.
Difference-Making Conditionals and the Relevant Ramsey Test.Hans Rott - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):133-164.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.

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