Are The Statue and The Clay Mutual Parts?

Noûs (2017)
Lee Walters
University of Southampton
Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments against the view concluding that there are both pre-theoretical and theoretical considerations for denying that the statue and the clay are mutual parts.
Keywords Constitution  Mereology  Material Objects
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/nous.12204
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