Are The Statue and The Clay Mutual Parts?

Noûs:23-50 (2017)

Lee Walters
University of Southampton
Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments against the view concluding that there are both pre-theoretical and theoretical considerations for denying that the statue and the clay are mutual parts.
Keywords Constitution  Mereology  Material Objects
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Reprint years 2017, 2019
DOI 10.1111/nous.12204
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References found in this work BETA

Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Oxford University Press UK.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.
Four-Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.

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Citations of this work BETA

Infinitesimal Gunk.Lu Chen - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-24.
Were You a Part of Your Mother?Elselijn Kingma - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):609-646.
Maurinian Truths : Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on Her 50th Birthday.Robin Stenwall & Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (eds.) - 2019 - Lund, Sverige: Department of Philosophy, Lund University.

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