Philosophy Compass 6 (11):817-827 (2011)

Authors
Meg Wallace
University of Kentucky
Abstract
Many of us think that ordinary objects – such as tables and chairs – exist. We also think that ordinary objects have parts: my chair has a seat and some legs as parts, for example. But once we are committed to the (seemingly innocuous) thesis that ordinary objects are composed of parts, we then open ourselves up to a whole host of philosophical problems, most of which center on what exactly this composition relation is. Composition as Identity (CI) is the view that the composition relation is the identity relation. While such a view has some advantages, there are many arguments against it. In this essay, I discuss several versions of the most common objection against CI, and show how the CI theorist can maintain that these arguments – contrary their initial intuitive appeal – are nonetheless unsound.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00430.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

View all 46 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Composition as a Kind of Identity.Phillip Bricker - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):264-294.
Identity.Harold Noonan & Benjamin L. Curtis - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Composition is Identity and Mereological Nihilism.Claudio Calosi - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):219-235.
Composition as Identity: Pushing Forward.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 18):4595-4607.

View all 38 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Composition as Identity: Part 1.Meg Wallace - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):804-816.
Many-One Identity and the Trinity.Shieva Kleinschmidt - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 4:84-96.
Principles of Composition and Criteria of Identity.Katherine Hawley - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):481 – 493.
Vagueness and Identity.Loretta Torrago - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:161-170.
Consequences of Collapse.Theodore Sider - 2014 - In Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 211-221.
Parts Generate the Whole but They Are Not Identical to It.Ross P. Cameron - 2014 - In Aaron J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.
Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self.E. J. Lowe - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Compositional Pluralism and Composition as Identity.Kris McDaniel - 2014 - In Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.
Donald Baxter's Composition as Identity.Jason Turner - 2014 - In Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-11-11

Total views
185 ( #62,231 of 2,497,803 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #37,540 of 2,497,803 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes