Composition

In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 250–251 (2018-05-09)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called “composition”. The fallacy of composition occurs when one incorrectly infers that the characteristics, attributes, or features of individuals comprising some group will also be found in the group as a whole. Inferences from a part to a whole can be made if additional assumptions are added to guarantee that the whole will have the property if the parts do. The easiest way to avoid this fallacy is never to assume that the characteristics, attributes, or features of individuals comprising some group will also be found in the group as a whole. One must inspect and evaluate the characteristics, attributes, or features of the whole separately from the parts of which the whole is comprised.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Division.Jason Waller - 2018-05-09 - In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 259–260.
Unrestricted Composition as Identity.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2014 - In Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 143-65.
What Do the Folk Think about Composition and Does it Matter?Daniel Z. Korman & Chad Carmichael - 2017 - In David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 187-206.
Composition as Identity Doesn’t Settle the Special Composition Question1.Ross P. Cameron - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):531-554.
Homunculus.Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray - 2018-05-09 - In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 165–167.
A Relevance Constraint on Composition.David Vander Laan - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):135-145.
Fallacies of Evidence.John Capps & Donald Capps - 2009 - In You've Got to be Kidding! Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 45–79.
Conceptual Conservatism and Contingent Composition.Josh Parsons - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):327-339.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
5 (#1,485,702)

6 months
4 (#754,937)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references