Informal Logic 14 (2):93-103 (1992)

Douglas Walton
University of Windsor
This paper, based on research in a forthcoming monograph, Commitment in Dialogue, undertaken jointly with Erik Krabbe, explains several informal fallacies as shifts from one type of dialogue to another. The normative framework is that of a dialogue where two parties reason together, incurring and retracting commitments to various propositions as the dialogue continues. The fallacies studied include the ad hominem, the slippery slope, and many questions
Keywords fallacies, dialogue, ad hominem, slippery slope, argumentation, maieutic function, dark-side commitments
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What's Wrong with Slippery Slope Arguments?Trudy Govier - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):303 - 316.

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Refutation by Parallel Argument.André Juthe - 2008 - Argumentation 23 (2):133–169.
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