Hume on Regulating Belief and Moral Sentiment

Hume Studies 28 (1):83-111 (2002)

This paper offers an interpretation of Hume's general point of view in morals as a kind of focusing activity that counterbalances situated sentiments and thereby regulates moral sentiment. The general point of view is compared to Hume's treatment of the regulation of belief. This comparison sheds new light on how production of contrariety through the general point of view is regulative in morals. The general point of view does not undermine Hume's sentimentalist thesis in morals. Rather, it is a perspective in which sentiment is properly aroused and directed, and within which justificatory practices take place. The comparison with belief-regulating mechanisms suggests that Hume has a unified or systematic treatment of regulation
Keywords History of Philosophy  Major Philosophers
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Reprint years 2002
ISBN(s) 0319-7336
DOI 10.1353/hms.2011.0221
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