Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory?

Synthese 178 (3):503-514 (2011)
Abstract
Revised simulation theory allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor's genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias. I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors' own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided by revised simulation theory
Keywords Egocentric bias  False consensus effect  Goldman  Mindreading  Rationality theory  Revised simulation theory  Simulation  Simulation theory  Theory of mind  Theory theory  True false consensus effect  Quarantine failure
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9653-2
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The Inference to the Best Explanation.Gilbert H. Harman - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.
Against Simulation: The Argument From Error.R. Saxe - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-79.

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