Identity of Persons and Objects: Why Hume Considered Both as Two Sides of the Same Coin

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):147-167 (2010)
Abstract
By investigating one of the major inconsistencies that Hume's parallel treatment of the identity of persons and objects issues, this essay offers an unconventional account of what it needs to avoid a dualist picture of mind and world. It will be argued that much hinges on the question of whether or not one is willing to allow the principally unperceivable to enter into one's concept of reality. Hume, as will be shown, rejects this approach: he denies that we have reason to think that there are substances that divide the world into two separate realms. The strategic value of this move is that it enables us to think of minds in terms similar to those underlying our conception of physical objects without urging us to engage in reductionist or eliminativist projects.
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DOI 10.3366/jsp.2010.0004
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References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
Treatise on Human Nature.David Hume - 1739 - Oxford University Press.
Hume's Sceptical Materialism.Stephen Buckle - 2007 - Philosophy 82 (4):553-578.

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