John Venn's opposition to probability as degree of belief

Abstract
John Venn is known as one of the clearest expounders of the interpretation of probability as the frequency of a particular outcome in a potentially unlimited series of possible events. This view he held to be incompatible with the alternate interpretation of probability as a measure of the degree of belief that would rationally be held about a certain outcome based upon the reliability of testimony and other prior information. This paper explores the reasons why Venn may have been so opposed to the degree-of-belief interpretation and suggests that it may have been a way for him to resolve a conflict in his own mind between his ideas of proper scientific methods of inference and the religious beliefs that he held as a young man.Keywords: John Venn; Degree of belief; Probability; Frequency theory
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.09.002
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References found in this work BETA
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.Hume David - 1955 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), The Monist. Oxford University Press. pp. 112.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.Hume David (ed.) - 1904 - Oxford University Press UK.
Ramsey, Truth, and Probability.S. L. Zabell - 1991 - Theoria 57 (3):211-238.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Venn's Hypothetical Infinite Frequentism and Logic.Lukas M. Verburgt - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):248-271.

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