Maximality, duplication, and intrinsic value

Ratio 24 (3):311-325 (2011)

Authors
Sean Walsh
University of Notre Dame (PhD)
Abstract
In this paper, I develop an argument for the thesis that ‘maximality is extrinsic’, on which a whole physical object is not a whole of its kind in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Theodore Sider has a number of arguments that depend on his own simple argument that maximality is extrinsic. However, Peter van Inwagen has an argument in defence of his Duplication Principle that, I will argue, can be extended to show that Sider's simple argument fails. However, van Inwagen's argument fails against a more complex, sophisticated argument that maximality is extrinsic. I use van Inwagen's own commitments to various forms of causation and metaphysical possibility to argue that maximality is indeed extrinsic, although not for the mundane reasons that Sider suggests. I then argue that moral properties are extrinsic properties. Two physically identical things can have different moral properties in a physical world. This argument is a counterexample to a classical ethical supervenience idea (often attributed to G.E. Moore) that if there is identity of physical properties in a physical world, then there is identity in moral properties as well. I argue moral value is ‘border sensitive’ and extrinsic for Kantians, utilitarians, and Aristotelians
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00502.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 40,183
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Modal Mereology and Modal Supervenience.Sean Drysdale Walsh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):1-20.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Maximality and Intrinsic Properties.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):357 - 364.
Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.
Extended Simples.Kris McDaniel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases?Gabriele Contessa - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):622-638.
Intrinsic Properties.Theodore Sider - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):1 - 27.
Physicalism and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties.Alyssa Ney - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):41 – 60.
Do Relations Require Underlying Intrinsic Properties? A Physical Argument for a Metaphysics of Relations.Michael Esfeld - 2003 - Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 4 (1):5-25.
A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions.J. McKitrick - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.
What Multiple Realizability Does Not Show.Robert Francescotti - 1997 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-08-05

Total views
31 ( #258,395 of 2,237,462 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #390,216 of 2,237,462 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature