Authors
R. Jay Wallace
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
If there is room for a substantial conception of the will in contemporary theorizing about human agency, it is most likely to be found in the vicinity of the phenomenon of normativity. Rational agency is distinctively responsive to the agent's acknowledgment of reasons, in the basic sense of considerations that speak for and against the alternatives for action that are available. Furthermore, it is natural to suppose that this kind of responsiveness to reasons is possible only for creatures who possess certain unusual volitional powers, beyond the bare susceptibility to beliefs and desires necessary for the kind of rudimentary agency of which the higher animals are arguably capable.
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246100008687
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.

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Citations of this work BETA

Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intellectual Isolation.Jeremy David Fix - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):491-520.

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