Gestalt Theory 43 (3):347-374 (2021)

Abstract
Summary In 1919 Nicolai Hartmann convincingly justified that there cannot exist a “general law of causation” as A. Meinong had in mind. For him Meinong’s understanding of causation was bound on the region of the physical layer of being, simultaneously postulating it as the only possible causation there. This is the starting point of the comparison between N. Hartmann‘s understanding of causation and that of the Gestalt Theory, for which neither in psychic nor in natural context linear-successive causality plays a part. Therefore NH’s conception of 1919 was still completely incompatible with that of the Gestalt Theory despite the fact that he was distancing himself from the “general law of causation” sensu Meinong. 20 years later he changed this by adding the “Wechselwirkung” to the linear successive causation in the physical layer. In doing so he approached the Gestalt theoretical position but failed it insofar as for it his linear-successive understanding of causation generally has had its day with regard to natural processes, also consequently for the physical. Thus the term “causation“ had become free for a dynamic concept of causation which is equally appropriate for the physical and the psychic. NH makes this move not until 1949, shortly before his death, by writing:.... It is the opinion of the author of this work that the ingenious systematics of NH‘s Critical Ontology should make it possible to execute the necessary corrections in some details of his theory of layers without questioning the structure of his systematics, thus carrying out what NH was not able to do himself due to his death.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.2478/gth-2021-0023
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,290
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie.W. Stegmüller - 1953 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 15 (3):530-531.
Zur Psychologie des produktiven Denkens.Karl Duncker - 1937 - Erkenntnis 7 (1):121-123.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Chapter 13: Between Ontology and the Theory of Objects: Nicolai Hartmann and Hans Pichler.Giuseppe D’Anna - 2011 - In Roberto Poli, Carlo Scognamiglio & Frederic Tremblay (eds.), The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 253-268.
Between Ontology and the Theory of Objects: Nicolai Hartmann and Hans Pichler.Giuseppe D'Anna - 2011 - In Roberto Poli, Carlo Scognamiglio & Frederic Tremblay (eds.), The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 253.
On Cicovacki's Introduction to Nicolai Hartmann's Philosophy. [REVIEW]Frederic Tremblay - 2014 - Quaestio: Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 14:348-.
Nicolai Hartmann's Definition of Biological Species.Frederic Tremblay - 2011 - In Roberto Poli, Carlo Scognamiglio & Frederic Tremblay (eds.), The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 125--139.
Nicolai Hartmann as a Post-Neo-Kantian.Alicja Pietras - 2011 - In Roberto Poli, Carlo Scognamiglio & Frederic Tremblay (eds.), The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 237.
Nicolai Hartmann's Plato. A Tribute to the “Power of Dialectics”(Parmenides, 135c 2).Claudia Luchetti - 2011 - In Roberto Poli, Carlo Scognamiglio & Frederic Tremblay (eds.), The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 221.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2022-01-13

Total views
2 ( #1,453,146 of 2,518,734 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #408,070 of 2,518,734 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes