Plurality of one world
David Lewis adopts a counterpart theory of individuals to account for how it is that Humphrey has the modal property of ‘could have won the election.’ Once counterpart theory is taken on board, however, I think that the motivation for having a plurality of worlds is untenable. I will claim that counterpart theory with respect to individuals invites counterpart theory with respect to properties1, which in turn invites an analysis of modality that involves only one possible world, viz., the actual world.
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