Reason and respect

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15 (2019)
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Abstract

This chapter develops and defends an account of reason: to reason is to scrutinize one’s attitudes by consulting the perspectives of other persons. The principal attraction of this account is its ability to vindicate the unique of authority of reason. The chapter argues that this conception entails that reasoning is a robustly social endeavor—that it is, in the first instance, something we do with other people. It is further argued that such social endeavors presuppose mutual respect on the part of those participating in them. The account therefore yields a form of Kantian constructivism: we have an unconditional duty of respect for persons because such a duty is implicit in the very nature of reasoning.

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Kenneth Walden
Dartmouth College

Citations of this work

Could Morality be a Social Construction?Hallvard Lillehammer - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-14.

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References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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