Précis of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):680-681 (2002)
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Abstract

Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments offers an account of moral responsibility. It addresses the question: what are the forms of capacity or ability that render us morally accountable for the things we do? A traditional answer has it that the conditions of moral responsibility include freedom of the will, where this in turn involves the availability of robust alternative possibilities. I reject this answer, arguing that the conditions of moral responsibility do not include any condition of alternative possibilities. In the terms that have become familiar, the book thus defends a compatibilist account of moral responsibility.

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R. Jay Wallace
University of California, Berkeley

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