Abstract
Knowledge plays an important role in argumentation. Yet, recent work shows that standard conceptions of knowledge in epistemology may not be entirely suitable for argumentation. This paper explores the role of knowledge in argumentation, and proposes a notion of knowledge that promises to be more suitable for argumentation by taking account of: its dynamic nature, the defeasibility of our commitments, and the non-monotonicity of many of the inferences we use in everyday reasoning and argumentation.
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References found in this work BETA

Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
"What Is Knowledge?".Linda Zagzebski - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 92-116.

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