Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):529-543 (2014)

Robyn Waller
Iona College
In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose an account of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible for an action just when that action is the product of her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, where reasons-responsiveness is explained in terms of the mechanism’s regular reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity. In a review of Fischer and Ravizza’s book Mele contends that their weakly reasons-reactivity condition is inadequate, constructing a case in which, according to their theory, an extreme agoraphobic is morally responsible for his staying in his home. In this paper I modify Fischer and Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility in light of Mele’s problematic example, suggesting a refinement of their weakly reasons-reactivity requirement via a distinction between weakly sufficient reasons and strongly sufficient reasons
Keywords Moral responsibility  Weakness of will  Reasons  John Martin Fischer  Alfred Mele
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-013-9460-1
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Nicomachean Ethics.Martin Aristotle & Ostwald - 1962 - Hackett Publishing Company.

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