In a recent paper published in this journal, Hughes (2019) has argued that Machery’s (2017) Dogmatism Argument is self-defeating. Machery’s (2019) reply involves giving the Dogmatism Argument an inductive basis, rather than a philosophical basis. That is, he argues that the most plausible contenders in the epistemology of disagreement all support the Dogmatism Argument; and thus, it is likely that the Dogmatism Argument is true, which gives us reason to accept it. However, Machery’s inductive argument defines the leading views in terms of their citation counts. But there is no necessary connection between citation counts and truth; it is a truism that many highly cited papers over the past century have turned out to contain false arguments. This inductive information should lead Machery to revise his argument; what Machery (2019) owes—but has failed to provide—is a positive argument for ruling out another plausible contender that Hughes (2019) raises. Without such an account, Machery’s inductive case for the Dogmatism Argument fails.
Keywords experimental philosophy  experimental epistemology  epistemology of disagreement  Edouard Machery  epistemology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09672559.2021.1898440
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds.Edouard Machery - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.
Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nick Hughes - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):591-596.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Are Gettier Cases Disturbing?Peter Hawke & Tom Schoonen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1503-1527.
Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds.Edouard Machery - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
From Conceptual Representations to Explanatory Relations.Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):218-219.
Empirical Data and the Theory of Reference.Genoveva Marti - 2012 - In William P. Kabasenche, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Reference and Referring. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy. MIT Press. pp. 63-82.


Added to PP index

Total views
83 ( #124,802 of 2,432,833 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
83 ( #8,172 of 2,432,833 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes