Sensitivity and Higher-Order Knowledge

Authors
Kevin Wallbridge
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Vogel, Sosa, and Huemer have all argued that sensitivity is incompatible with knowing that you do not believe falsely, therefore the sensitivity condition must be false. I show that this objection misses its mark because it fails to take account of the basis of belief. Moreover, if the objection is modified to account for the basis of belief then it collapses into the more familiar objection that sensitivity is incompatible with closure.
Keywords Sensitivity  higher-order knowledge  reflective knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12164
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References found in this work BETA

Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):137-49.
Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 264--287.

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Citations of this work BETA

Sensitivity, Induction, and Miracles.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):118-126.

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