Skepticism and Nataturalism: Can Philosophical Skepticisim be Scientifically Tested?

Theoria 70 (1):62-97 (2004)
Abstract
It may be possible to scientifically test philosophical skepticism; at least this is what I shall maintain. The argument develops the naturalistic insight that there may be no particular reason to suppose that nature has selected Homo sapiens’ epistemic capacities such that we are ideally suited to forming a true theory of everything, or indeed, a true theory of much of anything. Just as chimpanzees are cognitively limited - there are many concepts, ideas, and theories beyond their grasp - so too might our conception of the universe seem limited from the point of view of some creature more “evolved” than humans. On the other hand, some physicists (et al.) have argued that humans are on the verge of discovering a “final theory of everything”. Such epistemic “optimism” seems to directly contradict the idea that we might be cognitively limited. To adjudicate between these views I shall suggest the outlines of several “crucial tests” that involve attempting to create creatures who stand to us, with respect to intelligence and wisdom, as we do to apes. A positive result from any of these experiments will indicate that the skeptical view is correct, while failure to create “higher” intelligences lends support to the epistemic optimists’ position. 2.
Keywords skepticism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2004.tb00980.x
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Astrophysical Fine Tuning, Naturalism, and the Contemporary Design Argument.Mark A. Walker & M. Milan - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):285 – 307.
Astrophysical Fine Tuning, Naturalism, and the Contemporary Design Argument.Mark A. Walker & Milan M. Ćirković - 2006 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):285-307.

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