Dialectica 68 (3):355-373 (2014)

Meg Wallace
University of Kentucky
It has been argued by some that the argument from vagueness is one of the strongest arguments in favor of the theory of temporal parts. I will neither support nor dispute this claim here. Rather, I will present a version of the argument from vagueness, which – if successful – commits one to the existence of modal parts. I argue that a commitment to the soundness of the argument from vagueness for temporal parts compels one to commit to the soundness of the argument from vagueness for modal parts. I say compels, but not entails; an objection to one of the arguments highlights analogous ways to reject the other, making it difficult to endorse one and reject the other. This would be a significant conclusion, if true, since there are far fewer who currently commit themselves to modal parts than the many who currently commit themselves to temporal parts
Keywords metaphysics  modal parts  vagueness
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12073
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

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